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DETENTION DAMAGES IN EMINENT
DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
BY JACOB SCHIFFMAN*

and PATRICK J. TOOLE, JR.**

A new interest in eminent domain exists because of the ever-increasing
amounts of land taken for public use. Court calendars are reflecting
the expanded prevalence of condemnation cases. In recent years our courts
and boards of view have had occasion to consider numerous problems in
this field. The importance of eminent domain today is apparent as
we consider the extent to which private property may be taken
for public use. The Commonwealth's Department of Highways appropriates
land for its program of highway construction and improvement. The turnpike system exists because of the authorized use of condemnation proceedings.
The Department of Forests and Waters, in fulfillment of its flood control
responsibility and land acquisition requirements, utilizes the power of eminent
domain. Counties are resorting to this procedure in governmental functions.
City redevelopment and urban renewal projects, as well as public utilities,
employ eminent domain as an integral part of their programs.
The United States1 and Pennsylvania 2 constitutions both expressly
provide that private property cannot be taken for public use without just
compensation. Difficulties arise in determining what is just compensation
in eminent domain proceedings. Three basic types of damages may be available
to the property owner when his land is taken for public use. (1) Upon
appropriation he acquires an immediate right to the fair market value of
the land. 3 This claim, however, does not become a debt until the amount has
been definitely ascertained, 4 either by agreement between the parties or by
judicial determination. When the amount of the claim is finally determined
it relates back to the time of taking. 5 (2) He may be entitled to recover
detention damages from the date of the taking of the property to the date of
* B.S., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., New York University Law School; Judge
of the Court of Common Pleas in the Eleventh Judicial District of Pennsylvania.
** A.B., Kings College; LL.B., Temple University Law School; member of the
Luzerne County Bar.
1. "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. "Nor shall private property be taken or applied to public use, without authority
of law and without just compensation being first made or secured." PA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
3. Kenter v. United States, 156 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1946). Where there is a partial
taking of the land, the damages equal the difference between the fair market value immediately before and immediately after the taking. Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. City
of Philadelphia, 192 Pa. 632 (1899).
4. Whitcomb v. Philadelphia, 264 Pa. 277, 107 AtI. 765 (1919).

5. Ibid.
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the award as compensation for delay in payment.6 (3) He may receive interest
7
from the date of the award to the date of payment.
This Article will discuss detention damages-the manner of computing
them, the period of time for which they can be recovered, and how the condemnor and condemnee can protect their respective interests. Detention damages
generally may be defined as the amount due the landowner for the condemnor's
failure to compensate him at the time of the appropriation and for the delay
in payment until the specific amount due is determined." The objective in
allowing detention damages is to make the owner of the property whole 9to put him in the same economic condition he would be in if condemnation
had not occurred. Since the purpose is to compensate the owner for injuries
he has received through delay in payment by the condemnor, he may not be
entitled to detention damages where the delay has been caused by his failure
to co-operate or by unreasonable demands. 10
In many respects detention damages resemble interest. This is especially
so since the sum is awarded as damages for the detention of money and is
generally computed by applying the normal commercial rate of interest during
the period of detention to the market value of the land. 1 Unless evidence is
introduced that the commercial rate of interest is less, the legal rate of six
per cent is presumed.1 2 In discussing the distinctions between interest and
detention damages the judge in an early Pennsylvania case' s observed that
6.
7.

Wolf v. Commonwealth, 403 Pa. 499, 170 A.2d 557 (1961).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 43 (1958). The statute provides:
The amount of damages allowed in a report of viewers for the taking, injury
or destruction of property by the exercise of the right of eminent domain shall, as
finally confirmed, bear interest at the rate of six per centum per annum from the
date of the filing of the report.
In Wolf v. Commonwealth, supra note 6, at 506-07, 170 A.2d at 561 the court recognized
that under prior decisions the Commonwealth had been immune from paying interest
after the award. In Wolf, however, it was thought that the constitutional mandate of "just
compensation" required that the person whose property had been taken be paid interest
from the date of the award until payment. The statute would appear to make this
observation dictum.
8. See Waugh v. Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166 n.1, 146 A.2d 297 n.1 (1958).
9. Moffat Appeal, 400 Pa. 123, 161 A.2d 353 (1960). The case was remanded
for a finding as to whether the owner had acted unreasonably or in bad faith in the
negotiations. The court distinguished detention compensation in condemnation cases from
interest as of right in actions of contract or tort. If the plaintiff was at fault in contributing to the delay his award should be reduced accordingly.
10. Ibid.
11. Waugh v. Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166, 146 A.2d 297 (1958).
12. Ibid. Accord, Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Turnpike Comm'n, 401 Pa. 135, 165
A.2d 383 (1960). Although the parties had stipulated that the prime commercial rate
of interest was 4%, the lower court acted properly in adjusting the rate to 6% since
the condemnor had failed to introduce evidence of the normal commercial rate of
interest. The court drew a distinction between prime commercial rate of interest which
is charged to borrowers with exceptionally good credit and normal commercial rate
which is charged to average or normal borrowers.
13. Richards v. Citizens Natural Gas Co., 130 Pa. 37, 18 At. 600 (1889).
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interest is recoverable as of right while detention damages are not authorized
unless the circumstances of the case require them for full compensation.
Interest is recoverable for the failure to pay a liquidated sum on the date it
becomes due while in the case of detention damages the debt is not liquidated
on the date of appropriation, when it is technically due.
It has been stated that the period of time for which detention damages
can be recovered extends from the date of the taking to the date of the award.
However, there may be some question as to when the taking actually occurs
for purposes of computing detention damages. It may be held to occur upon
the adoption of a condemnation resolution or ordinance by the body authorized
to appropriate private property for public use,14 upon filing the plans as
authorized by law,"5 upon filing the bond to secure payment of the compensation, 16 or not until actual entry on the land. 17 In order to determine when
the taking occurs in each situation it is necessary to examine both the
statute which authorizes the taking and the case law which interprets it.
In preparing his case for hearing or trial the landowner who has had
his land appropriated for public use is faced with the decision of how to
present most effectively his claim for damages. It would seem advisable for
the condemnee to refrain from introducing any evidence of the normal commercial rate of interest. Since the maximum rate of six per cent is presumed
unless there is evidence to the contrary, this presumption operates to the
benefit of the condemnee.
A more difficult problem arises with the question of whether or not the
condemnee should testify as to the fair market value of the real estate. Although
14. Lakewood Memorial Gardens, Inc., 381 Pa. 46, 112 A.2d 135 (1955). In Henry
v. Allegheny County, 403 Pa. 272, 169 A.2d 874 (1961) it was held that plaintiff
property-owners' action for damages in eminent domain proceedings was not barred by the
statute of limitations because the taking occurred in 1958 when the commissioners
adopted a resolution providing for relocation of an existing road, rather than in 1925 and
1927 when the original construction of the road was authorized and completed.
15. In Lakewood Memorial Gardens, Inc., supra note 14, at 53, 112 A.2d at 139, the
court discusses The State Highway Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-208 (1961), which
provides that taking occurs when the plans are approved by the Secretary and Governor
and filed as a public record.
16. The court in Lakewood Memorial Gardens, Inc., 381 Pa. 46, 57, 112 A.2d 135,
141 (1955), distinguished condemnation proceedings by private corporations with the
power of eminent domain from condemnation by a public body for a public purpose.
Although the taking by a public body occurs with the adoption of a resolution, it is
necessary for the private corporation to file its bond in court before the property would
be deemed "taken." The reason given for this difference was that the resolutions of
a public body are of public record while the resolutions adopted by a private corporation
are not of public record and do not give notice of the proposed action.
17. Where the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission entered upon land which had
not been specifically included in the condemnation resolution which had been adopted, the
supreme court stated that the owner would be entitled to recover damages from the
date of entry on the property rather than from the adoption of the resolution. Rosenblatt
v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 398 Pa. 111, 132, 157 A.2d 182, 192 (1959).
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ownership of the land qualifies him to testify, 8 it may be to his disadvantage
to do so when expert witnesses are available. A determination must be
made of the anticipated impact of the owner's testimony. The factors which
must be balanced are the desirable effects of permitting the owner to testify
to any unique characteristics of the land which may enhance its value and
the possible unfavorable effects his self-interest will give his testimony. As
has already been observed, detention damages may be denied where the owner
has failed to co-operate or has been unreasonable in his demands. If the valuation which he placed on the land is completely out of proportion with estimates
by expert witnesses, it is possible that this could be used as evidence that he
has been unreasonable in his demands and may operate to reduce or defeat his
recovery of detention damages. In Wolf v. Commonwealth19 it was claimed
that Wolf should be denied detention damages because the valuations of his
real estate experts were approximately 400,000 dollars greater than the valuations of the Commonwealth's experts, The Commonwealth contended that the
discrepancy in the valuations was evidence that Wolf's demands were unreasonable and excessive. The court observed that Wolf had not given any
testimony as to his valuation of the land and concluded that there was no
evidence of unreasonable demand on his part since he was not bound by
the valuations of his experts. This case leaves open the question of whether
the owner could be denied detention damages where the sole evidence of
unreasonable demand on his part is his testimony as to the fair market value
of the land. In Springer v. Allegheny County"° the court held that it was
not error for the trial judge to charge the jury that it could consider the
discrepancy in valuations in deciding whether to allow detention damages.
The court admitted that an owner "could not be found to have been exorbitant
or unreasonable in his demands because of the valuations . . . by the expert

witnesses he produced at trial."'21 In this case, however, the owner had
testified as to the fair market value of the land.
The Springer and Wolf cases indicate the risks to the owner's recovery
of detention damages when he testifies as to value. They also indicate that
where an owner does not testify he will not be denied detention damages
because of the exorbitant or unreasonable fair-market-value testimony
presented by his real estate experts. If the experts' excessive estimation at
trial is not fatal to the owner's claim for detention damages, it is possible that
their unreasonable demands on his behalf during negotiations will not be
imputed to him either. Although the cited decisions do not deal specifically
18.
19.
20.
21.

Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. Pittsburgh, 316 Pa. 372, 176 Atd. 13 (1934).
403 Pa. 499,170 A.2d 557 (1961).
401 Pa. 557, 567-68, 165 A.2d 383, 388 (1960).
Id. at 569, 165 A.2d at 389.
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with this point, there appears to be merit to this conclusion. There would
appear to be considerable merit in the owner's decision to leave the negotiations and testimony as to fair market value in the hands of real estate
appraisers. Another way to avoid the* possibility of being denied detention
damages because of unreasonable demands might be to have all prior negotiations conducted by the attorneys for the owner. The lack of personal involvement appears to be an enhancing factor in the owner's quest for detention
damages.
When a public body possessed with the power of eminent domain appropriates private property for public use, there are many ways in which it can
minimize the damages for which it will eventually be liable. One way to limit
the recovery is to introduce evidence that the normal commercial rate of
interest is less than the legal rate of six per cent. 22 This evidence rebuts the
presumption that the legal rate of interest is the normal, prevailing rate to
be applied in computing detention damages.
Early partial payments might be employed to reduce or minimize liability
for detention damages and interest. It has been suggested that the Commonwealth can protect itself from having to pay interest from the date of an award
until final payment by paying "into court a substantial amount of the value of
the property at the time of its taking as reflected by the opinions and valuations placed on such property by real estate experts. 2- 3 Conceivably, it would
be possible for condemning agencies to make an intelligently calculated
anticipatory payment to the owner of the condemned property at the time of
the taking. Payment of the fair market value ultimately is inevitable.
The appraisal need not await trial since the factors to be appraised
are always available for the condemnor's experts. It might also be pointed
out that .the reduction of the final award would reduce any interest payable
on the award.
The condemnor in eminent domain proceedings may reduce, or even
completely eliminate his liability for detention damages by showing that the
delay in ascertaining the specific amount of the award was due in whole or
in part to the bad faith, lack of co-operation, or unreasonable demands of the
condemnee. 24 In Moffat Appeal-5 it was held that a property owner should
not be denied detention damages because of his failure to convene a commission
to assess his damages. However the court remanded for a finding as to whether
22. In Waugh v. Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166, 146 A.2d 297 (1958) the court
applied the legal rate of interest because no evidence was introduced as to the normal
commercial rate of interest during the period of detention.
23. Wolf v. Commonwealth, 403 Pa. at 507 n.7, 170 A.2d at 562 n.7.

24. Moffat Appeal, 400 Pa. 123, 161 A.2d 353 (1960).
25. Ibid. In Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 192 Pa. 632, 650
(1899), the court refused a claim for detention damages because the delay in payment was
due to plaintiff's "grossly excessive and unreasonable demands."
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he had acted unreasonably or in bad faith in the negotiations for assessment
of damages. The court stated that although his failure to convene a commission would not deprive the landowner of his right to detention damages,
he could be precluded from recovery by his lack of co-operation. Since the
owner of private property which has been condemned is prima facie entitled
to detention damages, the burden of proof is on the condemnor to show why
the circumstances may justify a reduction or complete denial of such
26
damages.
Where the property owner remains in possession after the appropriation
and continues to receive rents, issues, and profits, the recovery of detention
damages may be limited accordingly. In Patterson v. Buffalo, Rochester &
Pittsburgh Ry. 27 the court held that in determining detention damages the
jury should consider any uses, such as rents, issues, and profits, which the
property owner retains after appropriation. Such uses could reduce the award
of detention damages without preventing them altogether. Although the
property owner is using the land, he may be subject to restrictions in that
he cannot make improvements, plan for future developments, or enter into
leases.
Since in deciding whether the owner of condemned property is entitled
to detention damages his co-operation in arriving at the amount of an award
is so important, both parties should keep accurate records of negotiating
conferences and correspondence. All factors which have probative force
as to exorbitancy, unreasonableness, reluctance, or willingness to negotiate
should be carefully documented. Such detailed records may be very material
in determining whether or not the delay in payment was justified.
Detention damages can have a marked effect upon the final award. The
condemnee may receive six per cent interest on the market value of his land
computed over a significant period of time, unless the condemnor is
able to introduce into evidence circumstances which justify a denial of detention damages. Attorneys involved in eminent domain proceedings should
acquaint themselves fully with the manner of computing detention damages,
the period of time over which they can be recovered, and the various circumstances which may operate to authorize or deny the award.
26. Wolf v. Commonwealth, 403 Pa. 499, 170 A.2d 557 (1961).
27. 268 Pa. 555, 112 Atl. 101 (1920).
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